

# Cathedral School for Boys Site Safety Report

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**December 2024**



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## Executive Summary

The Cathedral School for Boys (CSB) Site Safety Report assesses the facility's current safety practices and infrastructure, providing actionable recommendations to enhance security, emergency preparedness, and operational efficiency. This report underscores the school's proactive approach to safeguarding its community.

### Key Recommendations:

1. Access Control and Perimeter Security
  - Strengthen physical access controls to reduce vulnerabilities caused by propped doors and unlocked entry points, including shared access doors with the cathedral.
  - Ensure roof hatches and utility areas are securely locked and inaccessible to unauthorized individuals.
  - Reinforce the Sacramento Street perimeter with additional territorial markers to improve safety.
2. Emergency Preparedness
  - Consistently designate and equip safer corners in classrooms and common areas with appropriate signage, supplies, and communication tools and consider assigning responsibility for this task.
  - Conduct regular staff training, including de-escalation techniques, active threat response, and "Stop the Bleed" courses.
3. Surveillance and Visibility
  - Expand camera coverage to include high-traffic and vulnerable areas like drop-off zones and the crypt and integrate shared camera access with the cathedral.
  - Improve lighting in dimly lit areas, especially under stairways and in the plaza, to deter unauthorized activity and enhance visibility.
4. Emergency Communication and Rally Points
  - Equip the school with additional radios and consider installing a repeater for better communication.
  - Reevaluate the rally and reunification points to ensure safe and accessible locations during emergencies, away from potential threats.
  - Clarify procedures for rally and reunification points and provide transportable supplies for these locations.

5. First Aid and AED Accessibility
  - Ensure that all AEDs are placed to create as much accessibility as possible and wall-mount all units.
  - Enhance classroom and other school first aid kits with larger medical kits containing wound care supplies and tourniquets.
6. Visitor Management and Front Desk Security
  - Implement a digital visitor management system to replace manual ID checks, improving efficiency and security.
  - Train front desk and security staff in situational awareness, documentation, and threat assessment to maintain a strong security profile.
7. Coordination with the Cathedral
  - Strengthen collaboration with the cathedral to address shared vulnerabilities, including emergency planning, shared camera access, and joint drills.
  - Resolve security gaps, such as the shared access door, to prevent unauthorized entry to the school.

## Background

This survey is not meant to identify every potential hazard, safety concern, training need, or emergency supply requirement. While we have noted many positive aspects of your facility, this report focuses on areas that may require further attention. It is designed to assess your facility's current state and highlight areas for improvement.

Private and public organizations across America are responsible for providing safe and secure environments for work and learning. These are places where employees and students should feel protected from undue harm and risk. By conducting this vulnerability assessment, your facility is taking a proactive step toward enhanced safety. This report provides an overview of your facility's current safety awareness, including findings and recommendations derived from on-site interviews, observations, and a review of materials provided by facility administrators.

## Scope

The following activities are within the scope of this project:

- Interviews with key staff members responsible for policy, administration, day-to-day operations, facilities management, and safety.
- A visual walk-through of the facilities with staff to assess physical site safety.

The following activities are NOT part of this security assessment.

- Testing current facility-developed safety plans or emergency response plans.
- We did not independently verify the information provided by employees.
- This security assessment does not include any aspect of IT/Cyber vulnerabilities, which should be assessed independently.

## Disclaimer

Any action taken by a recipient of this report or by their representatives based upon this security assessment does not guarantee nor warrant in any way whatsoever that the assessed location(s), facility, its users, or visitors may or may not be rendered safer, invulnerable, or in any fashion impervious to successful penetration, attack, or other acts which could cause property damage and/or personal injury to the facility or its patrons. By accepting this security assessment report and/or by taking or avoiding taking any action based on its written or verbal content, Cathedral School for Boys hereby agrees to release, waive, discharge, hold harmless, and not sue WVPA, DPrep Safety, any of their officers and/or employees, for any and all loss, harm, liability, or damage caused as a consequence of the security assessment, release of the written report, pictures, and assessors' opinions, including any loss arising from a claim of negligence. Further, by accepting this report, Cathedral School for Boys agrees to indemnify WVPA and DPrep Safety, its agents, officers, and employees from any loss, harm, liability, lawsuits, damages, or costs, including court costs and attorney fees. Any recommendations of materials (included in [Appendix A](#)) are solely for reference and do not constitute an endorsement of a product by WVPA or DPrep Safety.

## Facility-Wide Suggestions

### Exterior Signage

Effective signage and wayfinding are fundamental to workplace security, as they provide clear directions, identify hazards, and establish boundaries, thereby enhancing safety and preventing accidents. Strategically placed signs guide employees and visitors, reducing confusion and ensuring efficient evacuation during emergencies.<sup>1</sup> Signage and a well-maintained site also convey a sense of preparation and attention to detail that can deter crime or other hostile actions. Clear and sufficient signage aids emergency services personnel with improved navigation and timeliness of response during emergencies and other critical incidents.



<sup>1</sup> American Society of Safety Professionals. (n.d.). *Three ways signage can improve workplace safety*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from [https://www.assp.org/news-and-articles/three-ways-signage-can-improve-workplace-safety?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://www.assp.org/news-and-articles/three-ways-signage-can-improve-workplace-safety?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

Overall, signage could be improved at CSB. When addressing signage on historic buildings and landmarks, there is often a tension between the signage's outward aesthetic and maintaining the buildings' architectural qualities. However, the raised letters at the school's front entrance are difficult to read from the street. The glass doors make it difficult to see this as the main school entrance.



'Territorial reinforcement' refers to establishing and emphasizing boundary lines to identify where CSB's property begins and ends. This concept is central to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles and helps deter those intentionally or unintentionally encroaching on school property. Adding clear signage indicating the school property (including no trespassing signs on the fence) would improve the overall safety profile.


### **Moving Forward:**

- Exterior signage lacks visible street address numbers. Consider adding a highly visible address number to assist first responders and visitors.
- Consider additional wayfinding signage in classrooms and evacuation routes.
- Consider standardizing classroom signs so they are easy to read quickly during emergencies, particularly for those who may not be as familiar with the layout.

## Cameras

Cameras play a vital role in safety by providing real-time surveillance that can help detect and deter potential threats, ensuring a quicker response to incidents. According to the U.S. Secret Service, monitored and strategically placed cameras are essential for identifying suspicious behavior and enhancing situational awareness in critical areas.<sup>2,3</sup> Reviewing camera footage after the fact may provide investigative material or document a critical incident but will not aid in preventing an incident.

At the time of our visit, on-site staff did not have access to the camera feeds displayed in the front office or other areas of the school. Determining if the cameras record and how long the footage is stored would be helpful. Ideally, there should be at least 30 days of recorded footage. Another best practice involves sharing remote access for the cameras with local law enforcement to assist in response to critical incident events such as an active assailant.




<sup>2</sup> U.S. Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center. (2019). *Protecting America's schools: A U.S. Secret Service analysis of targeted school violence*. Retrieved from [https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Protecting\\_Americas\\_Schools.pdf](https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> Alcatraz Lock. (n.d.). *How CCTV cameras can help to prevent school shootings*. Retrieved from <https://alcatrazlock.com/how-cctv-cameras-can-help-to-prevent-school-shootings/>



Cameras provide three general functions when it comes to safety and security.

1. Cameras record what occurred on-site during a hazard, conflict, theft, crime, or other critical events. These recordings offer detailed documentation as well as legal risk mitigation when it comes to assessing how employees handle critical incidents. This footage may also be helpful in training scenarios and as part of an after-event review.
2. Cameras deter those who may be engaged in penetration testing or assessing the site as a potential target. For those planning violent action directed at a critical utility service, multiple cameras and signage warning about being recorded offer a level of hardening a target location that is part of a layered safety and security approach.
3. Cameras that are live monitored by office staff at their desks or broadcast to a larger screen in a public area increase situational awareness and response time when reacting to threats, physical altercations, or an active assailant. Providing this live feed link to local law enforcement is another way to improve their awareness when responding to an active assailant or other crisis on-site.



Lighting throughout the facility, particularly in spaces shared with the cathedral, was limited, potentially impacting the utility of the cameras. Given the size of the facility and the complicated nature of the shared space with the cathedral and CSB, a specific assessment of the cameras (including a discussion of access and placement) would be recommended.





**Moving Forward:**

- CCTV access was discussed, with a staged model suggested:
  - Coverage across all areas.
  - Active monitoring access in central locations (front desk and others) for better transparency.
  - Police access to the live feed during emergencies.
- Additional cameras should be added at pick-up/drop-off spots and the entrance from the plaza at room #102.
- A camera at the cafeteria access belonging to the church is not shared with the school. Shared access is recommended. A meeting with the Cathedral safety and security staff would be recommended to find areas where the two administrations can work more in tandem.
- Camera feeds should be monitored by front reception staff and made available to law enforcement via a secure link during emergencies.

## Emergency Medical Supplies/Lockdown Supplies


First aid response is dependent on two central concepts: materials and training. Having materials available without knowing how to use them is equally problematic as having people trained without providing access to materials. The American Red Cross recommends that first aid kits and AEDs (Automated External Defibrillators) be available in multiple locations and that all employees be trained in their use.<sup>4</sup>

Each classroom has a red backpack that contains emergency supplies in the event of a lockdown. Ensure that emergency supplies are available in each classroom and the larger shared spaces (cafeteria, library, and music classrooms in the basement). We also recommend adding a simple “boo-boo” kit to each bag, creating a process or checklist, and assigning a person to ensure the emergency bags are consistently stocked and accessible in each classroom and larger shared spaces.




<sup>4</sup> American Red Cross. (n.d.). *Workplace safety training courses*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://www.redcross.org/take-a-class/organizations/workplace-safety>

In each of the emergency/lockdown bags, there are personal protective gear (masks and gloves), a copy of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), emergency blankets, a flashlight, an ice pack, and granola bars.



The school has a well-stocked first aid kit in a central cabinet for the office. This cabinet is maintained by the company Cintas. They offer a plan which restocks the kit monthly/as needed. An AED was present near the first aid cabinet. Additional first aid supplies and AEDs are placed throughout the school.

The kitchen AED is moved to this water fountain when the kitchen is closed/locked. While we appreciate and acknowledge the importance of ensuring access to emergency medical devices at all times, these medical devices must be secured and ideally wall-mounted (even if they have a portable kit inside the mount) to prevent misuse, misplacement, or theft.




**Moving forward:**

- Most AEDs have signage, but the kitchen AED needs relocation to ensure constant accessibility. Additionally, all AEDs should be wall-mounted. While portability is useful, there needs to be more security around these kits to ensure they are not tampered with or removed from their location and unavailable in times of need. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- While AEDs are useful emergency devices, given that the primary community is made up of children (heart attacks are uncommon for this population), it would be a higher priority to invest in ***stop-the-bleed/wound-packing*** training for all staff. DPrep Safety offers this training, which would benefit all staff. The training and materials are central in responding to any active assailant or major injury. Blood loss is the leading cause of death during active shooting events. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Likewise, training related to choking and some of the newer technology related to emergency response to choking should be a higher priority investment for the school. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Another area we would recommend, even given the younger age range of the students, is the addition of Narcan for overdose treatment. The school's location in the downtown San Francisco area makes this a priority above AED. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Invest in ***several smaller first aid kits***, commonly known as 'boo-boo' kits, that would allow for more strategic placement around the facility and easier access to commonly used materials such as alcohol wipes and Band-Aids. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Add ***a first aid kit, a response kit for cutting and fire injuries, and a fire blanket*** for the kitchen to have materials closer to where an injury might occur. Example materials are included in [Appendix A](#).
- Ensure all ***staff are trained*** on AED use and basic first aid skills.

## Landscaping

According to the American Society of Landscape Architects, maintaining landscaping can enhance safety by creating clear sightlines, removing hiding spots, and creating opportunities for natural surveillance, all principles of CPTED. Well-maintained landscaping can also reduce the perception of neglect, further aiding in crime deterrence.<sup>5</sup>



City sidewalks and streets surround the property, and while there is little landscaping near the property lines, some potential issues must be addressed. CPTED teaches a “2-foot, 6-foot” rule to keep a clear line of sight across the facility. This means shrubbery should be no higher than two feet, and tree canopies should be trimmed to hang no lower than six feet.

The wall of ferns and plants to the left of the main entrance will need a regular maintenance and trimming schedule to prevent overgrowth that can serve as hiding locations. Given reports of unhoused people sleeping next to the school that require safety officers to remove them in the early morning, ensuring vegetation is adequately cut back should be a priority to remove any hiding spots.

<sup>5</sup> American Society of Landscape Architects. (n.d.). *Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) presentation*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from [https://www.asla.org/uploadedFiles/CMS/PPNs/Landing\\_Pages/ASLA\\_Urban\\_Design\\_PPN\\_CPTED\\_Presentation.pdf](https://www.asla.org/uploadedFiles/CMS/PPNs/Landing_Pages/ASLA_Urban_Design_PPN_CPTED_Presentation.pdf)



During the walk-through, we also visited the exterior of the cathedral. Here, we observed a burned area outside the cathedral, indicating possible unauthorized activities.

This could be due to cooking, vandalism, a protest or political opinion being expressed, or even a censer from a church service that was poorly extinguished. While the fire was contained in the stone area, cutting back shrubbery and vegetation is highlighted here as a further safety risk.

On page 27 of the 2019 assessment, there was mention of removing the stones found, "Sacramento Street at the main entrance to the school, there was an area with loose large stones that could be utilized for vandalism and/or burglaries. Consideration should be given to their removal."

These stones remained in several locations around the facility and appeared to be used for propping open doors to outside play areas.





### **Moving Forward:**

- Consider additional monitoring in the areas where unhoused individuals have been found sleeping in the early morning. The area mentioned was in the internal courtyard of the cathedral.
- These stones remain and present a hazard for vandalism, burglaries, and being used to prop open doors. While replacing all the stones has aesthetic and likely historical challenges, securing loose cobblestones for future repair should be considered to reduce the risk of these being used for criminal activity or propping doors open.
- Cut back shrubbery in line with the CPTED "2-foot, 6-foot" rule to reduce hiding locations and potential for fire exposure.

## Lighting

Lighting is important as it enhances natural surveillance by improving visibility at night deterring potential offenders. According to the International CPTED Association, well-designed exterior lighting reduces dark areas and increases the likelihood of criminal activities being observed.<sup>6</sup>

Exterior lighting was not observed during this assessment. On a return visit for potential training or additional services, we could obtain some pictures at night to be added as an addendum for this report. From public images, the lighting appears to be fairly effective, given the historic nature of the cathedral. The many glass windows of the school likely provide additional lighting. Internal lighting within the courtyard would be recommended for review, particularly given the reports of the unhoused sleeping in these areas.



Additionally, areas within the basement (or “crypt” area) below the school's main floor need additional lighting. Scheduling a secondary review of lighting and camera placement would be recommended moving forward.

### Moving Forward:

- The crypt has dark areas, particularly under stairways. Consider additional lighting and access prevention. This should be done in parallel with any review of the camera systems for this area to ensure adequate lighting for recording.
- A further assessment of exterior lighting during the evening hours would be recommended.

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<sup>6</sup> International CPTED Association. (n.d.). *Primer in CPTED – What is CPTED?*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://www.cpted.net/Primer-in-CPTED>



## Perimeter

Territorial reinforcement involves designing spaces to clearly define ownership, using elements like fences, signage, and landscaping to discourage unauthorized access and promote a sense of ownership by employees. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, establishing clear territorial boundaries enhances security by fostering ownership and responsibility among occupants.<sup>7</sup>



Using bollards to restrict motor traffic from entering the interior space is a best practice. This serves to communicate the safety elements in place to protect the community.



The picture to the right demonstrates improvements following the 2019 safety report and theft that occurred by gaining access to the window on the other side of the fence. This exhibits a commitment to review previous incidents and take intervention steps to improve the safety and security features of the outside perimeter of CSB.

We discussed the vulnerability caused by the small offset from the street due to the downtown location. The addition of secure fencing and a camera reduces the level of risk exposure.

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<sup>7</sup> Zahm, D. L. (2007). *Using crime prevention through environmental design in problem-solving*. U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from <https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/using-crime-prevention-through-environmental-design-problem-solving>



The fencing throughout the campus is high quality and designed well to prevent entrance into the interior areas of the campus. With the sharper points on top of this section of the fence, we recommend additional signage indicating not to climb the fence due to this danger. Additionally, the placement of the cabinet next to the fence provides an opportunity for students to climb over it more easily.

#### **Moving Forward:**

- Additional signage that would further communicate this is a school property would be recommended.
- The fencing has sharp points on top designed to serve as a deterrent to someone. Including *warning signs* about the danger of attempting to climb the fence would be recommended to mitigate legal risk.
- Cabinets and other items that can be used to climb over the fence should be moved.

## Exterior Facility Access

### Access Control

Access control is the ability to secure a site and regulate the keys and electronic systems that allow staff access to the facility.<sup>8</sup> Access control includes both after-hours and how employees and the public access the site during operation hours. Common systems include master keys and keys with more limited access, key fobs, locked doors, turnstiles, locked fences, sally ports/man traps, counters, and glass/plexiglass barriers.

At CSB, we observed the staff member checking IDs at the front lobby who appeared to be recording them into a notebook as well as scanning them. We were told this system checks if the individual is on the sex offender registry, among other screenings.

As outlined in the Emergency Operations Plan, a staff and visitor lanyard system is in place. The policy reads, "During school hours, all employees must wear a visible RED school lanyard. Upon check-in at the front desk, visitors are given either a BLUE lanyard (parent or community volunteer) or a GREY lanyard (vendor or contractor), that also must be always worn while on campus for easy identification. Anyone not wearing a lanyard should be immediately escorted to the front desk for check-in."

Administrative staff had keys to the building and other staff areas. Key and key policies were not detailed in the EOP and should be addressed moving forward.

The door remained open in the morning and at the end of the day during student drop-off and pick-up. This time is a heightened area of risk related to an intruder or missing child. Examining this process would be recommended.

Our team did not encounter a Knox box for fire access to the school. These boxes are typically red and found outside the school's main entrance. Fireboxes typically do not give access to police, whose boxes are often blue.

### Moving Forward:

- Consider a visitor management system that will allow for the creation of reports or quick access to data.
- Consider using an internal key fob system for easier access control for the interior of the building.
- Explore the need for fire/police Knox box access or if there is another local process in this geographic location.


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<sup>8</sup> School Safety Working Group. (2020). Ten Essential Actions to Improve School Safety. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Department of Justice.

McPhaul, K., London, M., Murrett, K, Flannery, K, Rosen, J. and Lipscomb, J. (2008). Environment Evaluation for Workplace Violence in Healthcare and Social Services. Journal of Safety Research, 237-250.

## Doors

Physical security measures like locked doors are fundamental in securing a workplace environment. Locked doors help prevent unauthorized access, protect sensitive information, and ensure the safety of employees and assets.<sup>9</sup>



As mentioned earlier, the loose cobblestones around the facility doors are being used to prop open doors. This negates all other safety and security measures used to secure the school.

Based on recommendations from the 2019 safety and security assessment, there has been extensive improvement to the access control, including a new buzzer system for the front entrance. Our team had our ID/driver licenses checked and run through a new ID scanning system provided by [Securly](#). We were asked to sign in and were given visitor lanyards.

Despite these improvements, we found the front doors were often propped open, and access for visitors should be more consistent. We observed a security guard who needed to be let in by students after being locked out. Additionally, we observed visitors in areas including the crypt, gym, and cafeteria without escort, and it was unclear how they obtained access to the building.

<sup>9</sup> National Center for Education Statistics. (1998). Creating safe and drug-free schools: An action guide - Chapter 5: School security technology. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/safetech/chapter5.asp>

At least one door/entry point in the cathedral is not secured and allows open access to the school. This unsecured door and visitor access to the school from the cathedral defeat the visitor sign-in, ID analysis, and lanyard processes.



While signage can be helpful in identifying areas of concern and potentially limiting access to restricted areas, they are not truly secure if the no-entry areas are not monitored or locked.

#### **Moving Forward:**

- All loose and displaced cobblestones around the facility should be immediately collected and secured for future repairs.
- Consider an educational campaign to prevent students and staff from propping doors open or letting in people without the proper ID. Our team could help design and implement this program if needed.
- Ensure safety and security staff have access to keys during their shifts to be able to enter, exit, and secure the facility.

## Roof

Roof access, while needed for maintenance, can be problematic if it is accessible to others intent on bad acts or who may put themselves in a dangerous situation, increasing risk and liability for the facility.<sup>10</sup>



There was no lock on the roof hatch; a curtain ring is currently used. This is a danger for students who may attempt to access the roof.

Given that this is a potential exit from the building in case of a fire, a fully secure locked door may not align with fire codes. In this case, an alarm would be recommended, with signage indicating that an alarm will sound if this door is opened.

### Moving Forward:

- The door to the roof must be replaced with a secure locking mechanism that follows fire codes.
- Creating signage with warnings about the dangers of accessing the roof should also be included.


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<sup>10</sup> Utah State Board of Education. (2019). *School safety*. Retrieved December 1, 2024, from <https://schools.utah.gov/schoollandtrust/resources/02.2019.SchoolSafety.pdf>

## Facility Interior

### Doors

Locked interior doors are vital for workplace security because they prevent intruders from freely accessing the facility. By limiting internal movement, they help protect sensitive information and assets and ensure employee/student safety. Implementing access controls like locked interior doors is essential for safeguarding organizational assets.<sup>11</sup>



There was inconsistency with locks on internal doors. Some offices had locks, some didn't, and the locks differed. Some required a key to lock from the inside. Having a lock inside the door would allow the door to be secured by someone in a lockdown/barricade scenario. When there is no locking mechanism on the inside of the door, it cannot be secured as effectively.

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<sup>11</sup> National Institute of Standards and Technology. (1995). *An introduction to computer security: The NIST handbook* (NIST Special Publication 800-12, Chapter 15). Retrieved from <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-12/800-12-1.html/chapter15.html>



Keeping a wedge or cobblesstone by a door or having installed door-propping devices (as shown above) is problematic as it allows the door to be accessed without control and conveys an unintentional message to the staff that propping open doors is a permissible practice in the facility. Propping doors or having unsecured pass-through doors have been noted in recent school shootings as ways an attacker has gained access to a facility or has been more easily able to move through the facility.

Another concern is that there is no secondary control point once a visitor has access to the lobby. After the door is remotely open, they can access the classroom areas and the rest of the facility.

One classroom with a glass door had a unique, in-floor door lock system. We recommend further training on the system for all staff and considering adopting this type of system in other rooms and offices around the school. We did not take a picture of this door-locking system while on-site, but it was like the [Nightlock](#) system highlighted below in these pictures. These systems lock the lower part of the door and follow most fire codes, as the locking mechanism is not attached to the door but rather to the wall.





The 2019 security assessment mentioned a specific concern: "At the time of my inspection, the Science Room had not stored all chemicals properly in a cabinet or closet. The chemical closet was not locked, and the glass doors securing various chemicals were open, which might cause a reaction if they shift in an earthquake." The chemical closet was unlocked during our visit as well. This should be secured moving forward.




### Moving Forward:

- Consider a consistent access control system for all interior doors, with staff having access in case of an emergency. While there may be a reason to have different locks on certain doors (exterior access, bathrooms, fire code), these should be consistent across all rooms wherever possible.
- While the design may be difficult, we recommend a secondary control point after someone is let in remotely for identification and other purposes. If this is not possible, installing internal territorial reinforcement in the waiting room with signs, counters, barriers, or floor markings would assist in communicating that visitors are required to stay in a certain area.
- Review the use of the Nightlock type door system installed in one of the classrooms and consider a larger training and implementation across other classrooms and spaces on campus.
- Develop a plan to identify a person in charge of locking and organizing the chemicals in the science classroom. This should be part of a start/end of day checklist to ensure it is secured when not in use.

## Electrical Panels and Utility Areas

Implementing physical access controls for sensitive areas is essential for protecting organizational assets and ensuring safety. Securing utility areas prevents unauthorized individuals from tampering with critical systems like electrical, plumbing, and HVAC equipment, reducing the risk of accidents, service disruptions, and security breaches.<sup>12</sup>



While some electrical cabinets were locked, the fire control panel was found with keys in the lock. While this was likely done not to lose the keys, it does negate the effectiveness of locking the fire access panel. The mechanical room was also unlocked, and the keys were left in place. Some knobs were also left unsecured, offering access to various gauges and water flow.

### Moving Forward:

- All access panels must be properly closed and locked, and the keys must be secured.
- Assigning a safety staff member to review these higher-risk areas to ensure they are locked at the end of each day would be recommended.



<sup>12</sup> National Fire Protection Association. (n.d.). *NFPA 730: Guide for premises security*. Retrieved from <https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/nfpa-730-standard-development/730>

## Windows and Window Coverings

Window coverings are an essential safety tool for active assailant situations. For doors with windows, the best practice is to provide a covering to obstruct an assailant's view into a classroom. Temporary coverings are preferable because permanent classroom privacy may increase the risk of sexual molestation, which occurs more often than shootings.<sup>13</sup> Window coverings are also important during active assailant incidents to provide concealment from the attacker.



The school has installed window shades in classrooms that drop quickly. These types of shades are best practice for schools because they are easy to deploy and allow for everyday light and visuals of the classroom outside critical incidents.



For some areas with larger windows, there are remotely controlled mechanical shades. In these areas, shutting the windows would offer little in the way of line-of-sight protection during an active assailant scenario.

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<sup>13</sup> Keehan, A. (2023). Secure Classroom Doors to Stop Active Shooters. Retrieved on November 15, 2024 from <https://www.ue.org/risk-management/premises-safety/secure-classroom-doors-to-stop-active-shooters/>


One of the school's architectural elements is a front with multiple glass walls and windows to convey a sense of a welcoming space. While this is ideal for a school setting to create an open climate, it does create some additional security concerns.



Blast or shatter-resistant film could be used on these windows, but the cost would be extravagant. An alternative would be to ensure students and staff understand that in any event of an active shooting critical incident, they should move quickly to a safer corner away from exposed windows.

Installing quick pull shades would also help reduce the visibility of targets from outside the school. Another option could be installing one-way glass that would limit visibility into the school but still allow light in.

Windows in classrooms and staff offices that can be opened from higher floors should have devices that limit the angle at which the window can open to reduce the risk of fall injuries.





### Moving Forward:

- Consider quick pull covers for all street-level windows.
- Consider blast/shatter-resistant film for key windows near entrances and courtyards.
- We recommend consistent window covering shades for all classrooms and other main rooms where students gather.

## Safer Corners

A safer corner is a designated area in a room where individuals cannot be seen from hallways, windows, or door openings. It is positioned in such a way that anyone firing a weapon through the door would be unable to hit people inside. Safer corners are considered essential for school safety, based on lessons learned from previous school shootings, such as the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School incident.<sup>14</sup>



Safer corners were designated in many classrooms with a picture of the school mascot, Forbes the Hawk, but consistent placement is required. Safer corners are equipped with a red backpack with first aid supplies, snacks, and other safety supplies for use during a

<sup>14</sup> New Hampshire Department of Safety. (2019). *Recommendations: Hard corners*. Retrieved from <https://schoolsafetyresources.nh.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Recommendations-Hard-Corners.pdf>

lockdown or other emergency. This was implemented following the guidance offered during the 2019 safety and security review.

In rooms where there is not a clear safer corner due to the size or exposure to the outside, we recommend the identification of a "safer room" to which students and staff should evacuate. For example, bathrooms or the utility area in classroom 213. In the cafeteria, the kitchen can serve as a safer room, provided it is unlocked.




### **Moving Forward:**

- Consider assigning responsibility to an individual or department for maintaining safer corners and ensuring proper signage.
- Ensure that the backpack is hung in every safer corner. This was inconsistently practiced across the classrooms.
- Consider moving the hard-wired phone to the safer corner in each area.
- Consider reviewing possible locations and creating additional safer spaces.
- These areas will need signage, supplies, and proper locking mechanisms.

## Visibility

Natural surveillance is a CPTED concept that involves designing and positioning features and people to enhance visibility and make it easier to observe activities. The goal is to remove potential hiding spots and improve the ability of authorized personnel to monitor and respond effectively. This approach helps deter aggressive behaviors by increasing the likelihood of detection and enhances the sense of safety for students and staff.<sup>15</sup>



Some areas of the school, such as the crypt, lack proper visibility and need surveillance measures.

### Moving Forward:

- While there is a camera in this area, it is controlled by the cathedral.
- Consider shared access or an additional camera in this and other areas.
- The lack of lighting in this and other areas is also a safety risk and should be increased.

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<sup>15</sup> National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (U.S.). Division of Violence Prevention. (2017). Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) School Assessment (CSA).

## Communication

The ability to communicate with other staff, administrators, and teachers around the school during a critical incident requires each staff person to have access to a two-way radio, with appropriate training on how to use this radio and which channels should be utilized. The school has two-way radios for administrative team members and plans to expand access to all staff in the building. Additionally, a two-way radio is always kept at the front desk.

These devices provide immediate contact among school staff, which helps both in emergency management and daily operations.<sup>16</sup> These radios are reliable through power outages and network issues that may impact the internet or cellular services. They also offer a relatively low-cost solution that can scale with the schools' needs.

Our team successfully tested the radios to reach the lower basement or crypt. The school leadership plans to purchase a repeater for the signal to ensure proper reach and operation of these devices.

The school phone system has a "page all" function that can also act as a loudspeaker throughout the school. An air horn system can also be used during critical events. The school has also purchased a satellite phone, which will give them increased support during emergency events.

### Moving Forward:

- Continue with the plan to purchase and train all staff on using these two-way radios. Acquire additional equipment, such as a repeater, to ensure the signal reaches where it needs to around the facility.
- Ensure coordination among the various communication methods to be used in an emergency, including the phone pager system, two-way radios, air horn, and computer duress/panic alarms.
- Ensure the satellite phone is included in the policy and procedure/EOP/CSSP related to training, charge, testing, and access codes.
- Implement an all-hazard training plan with wall flip charts.
- During critical incidents, using clear communication is critical. Larger rooms or areas on campus should be referred to by one name (e.g., cafeteria, theater), and areas such as the close and crypt should be referred to consistently in all communications. This prevents missed communication and confusion during a critical incident where outsiders to the school may not understand the dual meanings.

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<sup>16</sup> Dougherty, K. (2024). Prioritizing School Safety: The Value of Two-Way Radios in School Administration. Retrieved on December 23, 2024 from <https://marketscale.com/industries/podcast-network/icom/prioritizing-school-safety/>  
Bryant, K. (2020). The Role of Communications in Implementing a FEMA Emergency Response. Retrieved on December 23, 2024 from [www.ehstoday.com/safety-technology/article/21135511/the-role-of-communications-in-implementing-a-fema-emergency-response](http://www.ehstoday.com/safety-technology/article/21135511/the-role-of-communications-in-implementing-a-fema-emergency-response)



## Duress/Panic Alarms

Providing staff access to duress alarms (commonly known as 'panic' alarms) helps improve emergency service reaction time during a critical incident.<sup>17</sup> Ideally, there should be several of these alarms, some stationary and some mobile (to be used during tense meetings or student/parent interactions). These alarms should be tested quarterly to ensure they are properly working. Staff should be trained to understand how and when to use the alarm and who the alarm notifies.

Panic buttons appear to be installed on computers, and a shared channel with the cathedral is available in emergencies. The [Securly](#) software system operates this. CSB utilizes a few different options when it comes to signaling for help. These include two-way radios, an air horn, and a phone pager system.

### Moving Forward:

- Additional mobile panic or duress buttons should be reviewed with the alarm company used by CSB.
- Ensure proper training for all staff on how to use all the emergency alert systems and in what order they should be used during a crisis.
- Ensure consistent language is used to communicate various actions such as lockdown/barricade and shelter-in-place.
- Consider training for staff, including where the signal goes when they are used and quarterly testing.
- Consider creating a list of where all panic alarms are if this does not currently exist.

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<sup>17</sup> Hattersley, R. (2024). More Campuses Adopting Panic Alarm Tech, Most Satisfied with System Performance. Published by Campus Safety Magazine. <https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/insights/more-campuses-adopting-panic-alarm-tech-but-satisfaction-with-system-performance-is-slipping/161115/>  
How Panic Alarms can Improve School Security. Campus Safety Partner Series. Retrieved from <https://www.campussafetymagazine.com/resources/how-panic-alarms-can-improve-school-security/77216/>

## Additional Information and Recommendations

We want to thank the staff who took the time to walk our team through the facility. While the location is visually stunning, *the school's interior can feel maze-like*, particularly when traveling to the lower level or connecting to the cathedral. We recommend improved mapping and interior wayfinding to aid visitors and first-responder navigation in the event of a critical incident.

Another way to improve emergency responder efficiency is offering accessible times during the summer for law enforcement, emergency medical personnel, and the fire department to conduct internal training for their department. This is not intended as drills for staff or students but to better familiarize first responders with the facility and its nuances before first encountering them during a crisis.

Because of the nature of the relationship and shared physical space, *coordination with the cathedral* is essential. A crisis in one area may likely spill over to the other. There are also instances where different purposes and practices lead to potential vulnerabilities for the school. We want to stress this point clearly, as we experienced this while on-site. An open, shared access door allows anyone who has entered the cathedral to access the school's interior, bypassing the numerous safety and security investments and processes developed at the front entrance.

Ensure that those managing safety and security issues at the cathedral meet regularly with those at CSB to discuss issues related to emergency planning, training, and drilling together for critical incidents that may affect both facilities. Additionally, discussing a shared camera view for both locations would be recommended.

The first rally point for the school is in a plaza near the cathedral, which may be too close in an active assailant incident. The park across the street may provide a better location, although this does involve crossing the street. Huntington Park is the secondary rally point.

Supplies for each classroom should be augmented to include a bucket, which can be used as a makeshift bathroom during a lockdown/barricade. Emergency supplies should also be kept in a transportable container that can be taken to the rally points during a critical incident. Supplies, including identification and reunification materials, should also be available in a transportable container. Some excellent advice and training is available through the I Love You Guys Foundation related to developing and implementing a successful renunciation plan.<sup>18</sup>

Future training needs will be discussed in the Comprehensive School Safety Planning document provided along with the Site Safety Report. The following areas should be covered in these trainings based on our teams' observations:

- Clarifying for staff the differences between rally (where the school community might go after a fire), reunification (where students will assemble away from the

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<sup>18</sup> The "I Love U Guys" Foundation. (n.d.). *The standard reunification method*. Retrieved from <https://iloveguys.org/The-Standard-Reunification-Method.html#Intro>

- scene to meet with parents and families), and refuge points (reinforced areas within the school that provide a safer location to wait for evacuation).
- Active assailant training (DPrep's Mindset is one example) and an all-hazards emergency training with the staff.
  - Adding all-hazard flip charts in each office and classroom.
  - Specific training for security guards and front reception, as these security greeters and reception staff are the first line of defense for building and community safety at CSB. Consistent protocols, regular training, and awareness of current threats are essential to ensure their effectiveness. Developing a clear policy and providing monthly training sessions on topics including de-escalation, situational awareness, basic threat assessment, and documentation will help staff handle frequent challenges and maintain a strong security profile for the school.

The school is in the heart of downtown San Francisco, which means increased interactions with the unhoused population and those with mental illness. As our team passed during our midday assessment, a man stopped us and said, "It looks like you make a lot of money and should be eating better to ensure you stay in shape." While this good advice notwithstanding, this demonstrated for us the interactions with those with mental illness or the unhoused outside and around the school site. One story that was shared with us centered on some unhoused folks in the area who were found sleeping in the courtyard/close and would need to be moved on by security in the early 5 am hour. A burned area on the cathedral steps indicated someone had set fire to something there.

Given the separate nature of the school (the upper level and the crypt), there may be a different set of advice and direction given to students during a crisis. Students running up from the crypt without a visual of what is occurring upstairs could lead to an increased level of risk.

Finally, given the challenges of navigating the school grounds, having a robust and practiced missing child procedure would be an important addition to the Comprehensive School Safety Plan.

## Appendix A: Sample Products

### Medical

- Smaller “boo-boo” first aid kits: [Johnson & Johnson Travel Ready Portable Emergency First Aid Kit](#)
- Tourniquet: [Stop The Bleed® Basic Kit with CAT Tourniquet](#)
- Wound packing: [Critical Essentials Bleeding Control Kit for Chest & Limb Wounds](#)
- Security seals for AEDs: [Security Control Locks](#)
- Overdose kits: [Naloxone Overdose Emergency Kit Cabinet](#) and [Narcan medication](#)
- Anti-choking kits: [VitalVac](#), [LifeVac](#) and [Arixmed](#)

### Fire

- Fire Blanket: [Prepared Hero Emergency Fire Suppression Blanket for Kitchen](#)

### Lockdown/Barricade

- Window pulls: [Nightlock window shade](#) and [Hideaway Helper window shade](#)
- Door locking devices: [TeacherLock](#), [SAFE Bolt](#), [Brinks door security bar](#), [Door armor max](#), [DoorJammer Lockdown](#), [The Boot](#), [Bolo Stick](#), [Rhino Ware](#)
- Mobile panic/duress apps: [SHEQSY app](#), [Blackline Safety](#), [OK Alone](#), [Lone Worker app](#)
- Summary article on panic/duress alarms: [Deepdive: 2023 Panic Alarm and Mobile Duress Systems and Apps](#)